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TABOO, THE GAME: PATENT OFFICE
EDITION—THE NEW PREISSUANCE
SUBMISSIONS UNDER THE AMERICA
INVENTS ACT
ALEXANDER R. TRZECIAK†
ABSTRACT
Thorough patent examination ensures that issued patents confer
constitutionally granted incentives to innovate but do not create
inappropriately broad monopolies. Examiners at the United States
Patent and Trademark Office are alone tasked with striking this
proper balance, in part by searching the universe of existing published
knowledge to determine the originality of the applied-for invention.
In 2011, Congress enacted the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
which included a provision allowing the public to present examiners
with relevant publications that the examiners’ own searches might not
otherwise uncover. However, this “preissuance submissions”
provision and its related administrative rule are tempered by 35
U.S.C. § 122(c) (2006), which prohibits any third-party, pre-grant
“protest or other form of [preissuance] opposition” to an application.
Thus, although a party may describe to an examiner how its
submission is relevant to an application, that party is prohibited from
arguing how the submission renders that application unpatentable.
This Note argues that Congress should amend § 122(c) to permit
preissuance third-party argumentation for two reasons. First, the
current scheme arguably violates that law already. Second, a rule
allowing submitter argumentation would better incentivize
participation by competitive parties who fear that examiners might not
recognize their submitted publications’ full invalidating potential.
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Taboo, the game of “unspeakable fun” and popular variation on
the classic game of charades, invites one player to verbally suggest to
1
his teammates a word or phrase printed on each game card. The
catch: that player may neither say the given word or phrase, nor say
any of the commonly associated words or phrases that are also listed
2
on the card. This rule forces participants to be creative and indirect
in their communication under time pressure, for if the speaker utters
any of the “taboo” words during his round, a buzzer sounds and his
3
team loses points.
On September 16, 2012, the United States Patent and Trademark
4
Office (the Office) effected its latest variation on the game of Taboo,
although one much less common at family game night. In accord with
the changes to patent prosecution procedure set forth in the Leahy5
6
Smith America Invents Act (the AIA), the Office’s 2012 regulations
permit the public to submit to the Office any patents or printed
publications that bear upon the patentability of pending patent
7
applications. Thus, in an effort to thwart a competitor’s pending
application, a party may submit any printed publications that, alone

1. Milton Bradley Co., Taboo™ Instructions 2 (1989), available at http://www.hasbro.com/
common/instruct/Taboo_(1989).pdf. Taboo is different from the nonverbal game of charades
because it allows verbal, and only verbal, communication.
2. Id.
3. To illustrate, consider a hypothetical game card displaying the words “Duke
University” such that the cardholder’s object is to induce his teammates to guess those words
aloud. Printed below “Duke University” would be commonly associated words such as “devils,”
“Krzyzewski,” “Durham, North Carolina,” and “blue.” Because the cardholder is prohibited
from communicating any of these words to his teammates, he might instead say, “It’s a college
in the ACC, spouse of a duchess,” and so on. The buzzer possessor, a member from the
opposing team, also reviews the card and monitors the speaker’s compliance with the word
restrictions. Id.
4. Although the Office did not call its system Taboo, this Note outlines the similarities.
5. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be
codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 28, 35, 42, and 51 U.S.C.).
6. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,150 (July 17, 2012) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 1).
7. See id. Preissuance submissions must be filed prior to either six months from the time
the patent application is published on the Internet or the date of the examiner’s first rejection,
whichever occurs later. Id. at 42,173. The Office has not limited the scope of permissible
publications to prior art, id. at 42,161, which are existing patents or publications that bear on the
originality of a proposed invention.
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or in the aggregate, suggest that the application should be rejected on
8
any of the various grounds for unpatentability.
Submitting parties are also required to describe how each
9
submitted patent or publication is relevant to the target application.
The catch: like the speakers in the game of Taboo, third-party
submitters are prohibited from directly revealing their suggested
theories of unpatentability or directly arguing the merits of those
10
theories. Instead, submitters must communicate only indirectly with
11
the Office’s examiners, pointing them in a desired direction by
providing strategically chosen publications and craftily worded
descriptions of relevance. From these submissions, the examiners
must independently derive their own arguments against patentability.
If a submission does not comply with the Office’s restrictions, the
metaphorical buzzer sounds, and the submission is discarded in its
12
entirety.
The restriction on third-party arguments opposing patentability
stems from 35 U.S.C. § 122(c), which bars any “protest or other form
of pre-issuance opposition” to a pending application after the Office
13
publishes that application. Almost immediately after Congress
14
codified § 122(c) in 1999, the Office nonetheless created a limited
avenue for third parties to assist examiners in locating publications
15
relevant to any published application’s patentability. Building upon
8. A patent application may be rejected for many reasons. For example, the invention
may encompass nonpatentable subject matter, see 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006 & Supp. V 2011), some
of the claims may be indefinite or the application might fail to enable a person skilled in the art
to recreate the invention, see 35 U.S.C. § 112, or the invention might be preempted or made
obvious by earlier patents or other publications, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103.
9. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,173 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. §
1.290(d)(2)).
10. See id. at 42,156 (“[The rule] is not an invitation to a third party to propose rejections of
the claims or set forth arguments . . . .”); id. at 42,159 (“Unlike the concise description of
relevance required . . . for a preissuance submission, the concise explanation for [a different
procedure] allows for arguments against patentability.”).
11. See id.
12. See id. at 42,152 (“Third-party submissions that are not compliant with the statute will
not be entered into the [image file wrapper] of an application or considered, and will be
discarded.”).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 122(c) (2006).
14. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106-113, tit. IV, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-552 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 122(c)).
15. See Changes To Implement Eighteen-Month Publication of Patent Applications, 65
Fed. Reg. 57,024, 57,056 (Sept. 20, 2000) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). For further discussion of
this limited avenue, see infra part I.B.

TRZECIAK IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

9/18/2013 4:21 PM

248

[Vol. 63:245

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

the Office’s procedural innovation, Congress enacted the America
Invents Act in 2011, including within it a provision greatly expanding
16
the Office’s earlier procedure.
Pursuant to the AIA, the Office promulgated its current rule in
17
2012. This rule requires third parties to include with each of their
submitted documents “[a] concise description of the [document’s]
18
asserted relevance” to the pending application, so long as that
description does not amount to a rejection proposal or an argument
19
against patentability. The AIA preissuance submissions provision
and the ensuing Office rule have provided third parties more tools
than ever to win the metaphorical game of Taboo and effectively
oppose pending patent applications.
Problematically, Congress left § 122(c) and its prohibition against
pre-grant opposition fully intact. Congress’s inaction here results in
two problems. First, particularly between the Office’s new
preissuance submissions rule and § 122(c), there now exists significant
tension in the law. Although the Office has responded with attempts
to delineate a clear distinction between preissuance submissions and
those actions that are prohibited by § 122(c), this Note argues that the
20
distinction is not clear at all. Second, because of the limitations
imposed by § 122(c), the preissuance submission rule provides
inadequate incentives for competition-driven third parties to
participate. Since an issued patent is presumed valid during
21
litigation, it can be presumed to have overcome all references
included within its application file. As a result of this post-issuance
presumption, potential litigants are generally reluctant to contribute
references to such a file because those references will have
22
diminished value in the event of litigation. That reluctance is at a
maximum when the rules prevent submitters’ clearest argumentation,
thereby reducing the perceived likelihood that examiners will
16. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 8, 125 Stat. 284, 315 (2011)
(to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122(e)) (allowing submissions of any printed publications with
accompanying descriptions of relevance).
17. See Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,173 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.290).
18. Id. at 42,173 (to be codified at § 1.290(d)(2)).
19. Id. at 42,156.
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2006).
22. Salvador M. Bezos, Third-Party Submissions, in 2 PATENT OFFICE LITIGATION § 14:39
(Robert Sterne et al. eds., 2012).
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recognize and employ the submitted references’ full invalidating
potential.
Although Congress made great strides in amending the
preissuance submissions procedure to allow greater public
involvement in patent prosecution, this Note argues that it should
take one additional small step to eliminate the legal tension between
the Office’s new preissuance submissions rule and § 122(c) and to
23
further boost participation of third parties. Congress should amend
§ 122(c) to permit third parties to supplement their submitted
references with direct arguments explaining not only how those
references are relevant to a pending application, but also how they
24
specifically render that application unpatentable.
This Note proceeds in two parts. Part I traces the evolution of
the current preissuance submissions rule. To this end, subparts I.A
and I.B outline the history of the Office’s prior programs providing
for different levels of third-party participation in patent prosecution.
Subpart I.C summarizes the legislative history of the AIA with
respect to its preissuance submissions provision. Subpart I.D
examines the Office’s rulemaking in response to the AIA, with
particular emphasis on the Office’s justifications for the current rule.
Part II advocates for further change in the law to provide greater
third-party participation in patent prosecution. Subpart II.A argues
that the Office’s current preissuance submission program is now so
extensive that it already transgresses § 122(c)’s restriction against
post-publication opposition. Finally, Subpart II.B proposes that
Congress should further the policy objectives behind the AIA by
amending § 122(c) to allow for third parties to supplement their
submissions with direct arguments against patentability.
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF PREISSUANCE THIRD-PARTY
INVOLVEMENT
A 1998 empirical study of three hundred patent-validity cases
25
found that 46 percent of challenged patents had been held invalid.
Commentators have long lamented that the existence of so many
“bad patents” has a detrimental effect on the economy and society as

23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part II.
25. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205–06 (1998).
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a whole. For instance, validity disputes in court “impose litigation
27
costs on society.” Also, owners of bad patents unjustly burden others
28
with license fees. In addition, because litigation is a lengthy process
29
that often costs millions of dollars, some licensees may opt to
30
continue paying royalties in lieu of challenging bad patents in court.
Finally, technology firms may choose not to enter a given market if
they find that competitors already hold overbroad patents in that
31
market.
In an attempt to identify a potential source of the weaknesses in
patent quality, some commentators have noted that Office examiners
spend only about eighteen hours reviewing a given patent
32
application. In that short time and among many other duties, each
examiner must search the entire universe of technical information for
invalidating prior art—existing patents or publications that either
disclose all elements of the claimed invention or render the claimed
33
invention obvious. One option for alleviating this heavy burden on
the Office is to invite interested members of the public to provide
34
examiners with prior art or other forms of assistance. The remainder
of this Part discusses the various programs that the Office has

26. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
1495, 1515–20 (2001) (discussing “the social costs of bad patents”); FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND
POLICY 5–6 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (discussing
“questionable patents”).
27. Lemley, supra note 26, at 1515; see also Doug Harvey, Comment, Reinventing the U.S.
Patent System: A Discussion of Patent Reform Through an Analysis of the Proposed Patent
Reform Act of 2005, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1133, 1164 (2006) (“[L]itigation over the validity of a
patent is costly and time-consuming.”).
28. Lemley, supra note 26, at 1515.
29. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, supra note 26, at 6; see also Qin Shi, Reexamination,
Opposition, or Litigation? Legislative Efforts To Create A Post-Grant Patent Quality Control
System, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 433, 435 (2003).
30. Lemley, supra note 26, at 1515; Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives To
Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why
Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 954 (2004).
31. See Lemley, supra note 26, at 1515–16 (noting the potential of patents to deter
competition). Professor Lemley also notes that, in practice, many companies do not actually
search for others’ patents in an effort to avoid knowingly infringing upon those patents. Id. at
1516.
32. See, e.g., Michael Meehan, Increasing Certainty and Harnessing Private Information in
the U.S. Patent System: A Proposal for Reform, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, ¶ 80,
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/meehan-increasing-certainty.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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implemented to increasingly integrate third parties into patent
prosecution.
A. Evolution of the Protest
In 1977, with the intention of both “improving the quality of
issued patents” and “avoiding the issuance of invalid patents,” the
35
Office promulgated a rule, 37 C.F.R. § 1.291 (Rule 291), which
established a written protest procedure for third parties to challenge
36
pending patent applications. In 1982, the Office clarified that
protests “may include any grounds which the member of the public
37
filing the protest believes to be applicable.” Among other
requirements, protest submissions must include “(1) a listing of the
patents, publications or other information relied upon; [and] (2) a
38
concise explanation of the relevance of each listed item.”
Emphasizing the restrictive nature of the protest procedure, the 1982
amendment provides that “the active participation of the member of
39
the public filing a protest . . . ends with the filing of the protest.”
Until 2000, the Office kept pending patent applications
40
confidential. Therefore, third parties were generally unaware of
pending patent applications and rarely invoked the protest
41
procedure. In the 1990s, however, several legislative efforts

35. Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 5588, 5589 (Jan. 28, 1977)
(codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.291 (1980)).
36. The Office had previously provided for a “public use proceeding,” a limited method for
persons “having information of the pendency of an application” to demonstrate that an
invention claimed in a pending application “had been in public use or on sale one year before
the filing of the application.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.292 (1976). Because the public use proceeding was
used infrequently, was rarely successful in leading to claim rejection, was a cause of prosecution
delay, and became redundant to the protest procedure, the Office abandoned it in 2012. See
Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of the LeahySmith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,150, 42,151, 42,160 (July 17, 2012) (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
37. Reissue, Reexamination, Protest and Examination Procedures in Patent Cases, 47 Fed.
Reg. 21,746, 21,749 (May 19, 1982) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
38. Id. at 21,752.
39. Id.
40. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (Supp. V 1999) (“Prior to amendment, text read as follows:
‘Applications for patents shall be kept in confidence by the Patent and Trademark Office . . . .’”
(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1994))).
41. Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward A Viable Administrative Revocation
System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 16 (1997). However, protests were also
allowed during postissuance, patentee-initiated “reissue” proceedings, which were made public.
Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 5588, 5589 (Jan. 28, 1977) (codified as
amended at 37 C.F.R. § 1.291).
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proposed that pending patent applications should be published and
42
made available to the public. During a 1996 notice-and-comment
rulemaking by the Office, several commenters raised concerns that
protests could be abused as pre-grant opposition if applications were
43
published. Opponents were concerned that such procedures would
lead to delay of patent prosecution and harassment of patent
44
applicants. Although the Office declined at that time to change its
45
policies, Congress soon addressed the opponents’ concerns.
The proposed Moorhead-Schroeder Patent Reform Act of 1996
46
(the 1996 Act) included an amendment to § 122, providing that
patent applications would be published eighteen months after their
47
filing. To allay fears that publication would lead to delay, the 1996
Act also mandated that the amendment could not be used “to create
48
any new opportunity for pre-issuance or pre-grant opposition.”
While the 1996 Act was never passed, a third iteration of patent
reform proposals, the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999
49
50
(the AIPA), was successfully enacted on November 29, 1999. As
the previous legislative efforts had attempted, the AIPA amended
51
§ 122 to provide for pre-grant publication of patent applications.
42. See infra notes 46–51 and accompanying text.
43. See Miscellaneous Changes in Patent Practice, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,790, 42,799 (Aug. 19,
1996) (codified as amended at 35 C.F.R. pt. 1).
44. Cf. Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks To Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 763, 783 (2002) (“For example, large companies with ample resources may choose to
stall the issuance of patents by small inventors.”). The Japanese Patent Office at one time
allowed third parties to initiate “slow moving” pre-grant opposition proceedings, but it
eliminated that procedure in the mid-1990s pursuant to an agreement with the United States. Sri
Krishna Sankaran, Patent Flooding in the United States and Japan, 40 IDEA 393, 405–07 (2000).
Unlike this Note’s proposed system, which would allow mere submissions of prior art and
accompanying argumentation, the more formal Japanese oppositions required examiners to
individually decide upon and respond to each opposition. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/GGD-93-126, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: U.S. COMPANIES’ PATENT
EXPERIENCES IN JAPAN 32–33 (1993). The Japanese process often delayed issuance for up to
five years. Id. at 33.
45. See Miscellaneous Changes in Patent Practice, 61 Fed. Reg. at 42,800 (“Nevertheless, as
neither H.R. 1732 nor H.R. 1733 has presently been enacted, analysis of whether modification
of §1.291 . . . is desirable in a pre-grant publication or expanded reexamination system is held in
abeyance pending enactment of H.R. 1733 or 1732.”).
46. Moorhead-Schroeder Patent Reform Act, H.R. 3460, 104th Cong. (1996).
47. Id. § 202.
48. Id.
49. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, tit. IV, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-552 (1999) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 5, 6, 273, 297, 311–318).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 4502.
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Importantly for the purposes of this Note, the AIPA also included an
amendment to § 122(c), providing that “the Director shall establish
appropriate procedures to ensure that no protest or other form of preissuance opposition to the grant of a patent on an application may be
initiated after publication of the application without the express
52
written consent of the applicant.”
Accordingly, in September 2000, the Office amended the protest
rules pursuant to the AIPA “to provide that a protest must be
53
submitted prior to the date the application [is] published.” Because
preissuance protests are permissible only before the Office informs
the public of any given application, it is likely that they are rarely, if
54
ever, employed.
B. Rule 99 Third-Party Submissions in Published Applications
Despite the restriction in § 122(c) on preissuance protests and on
55
any other form of pre-grant opposition, the Office invoked its
procedural rulemaking power in 2000 to create a new avenue for
56
third-party involvement in patent prosecution. Under the new 37
C.F.R. § 1.99 (Rule 99), interested third parties could submit relevant
prior art to a patent application file within a narrow two-month
57
window beginning when that application was published. For each
58
$180 payment, any member of the public could submit up to ten
patents or publications to be entered into an application file and

52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Changes To Implement Eighteen-Month Publication of Patent Applications, 65 Fed.
Reg. 57,024, 57,038 (Sept. 20, 2000) (codified as amended at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
54. The Office does not release usage statistics for the protest procedure. Nonetheless,
commentators have theorized that, based on obvious limitations, preissuance protests are rare.
See Janis, supra note 41, at 16.
55. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(c) (2006).
56. See Changes To Implement Eighteen-Month Publication of Patent Applications, 65
Fed. Reg. at 57,056.
57. Third-Party Submission in Published Application, 37 C.F.R. § 1.99 (2011). Rule 99 has
since been repealed and reserved. See Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submission by
Third Parties Provision of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,150, 42,173
(July 15, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.99).
58. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.99(b)(1) (requiring inclusion of “[t]he fee set forth in [37 C.F.R.]
§ 1.17(p)”); cf. 37 C.F.R. § 1.17(p) (requiring a fee of $180). Rule 99 did not limit the number of
submissions made by any single party, so long as $180 was paid for each ten patents or
publications. Bradley William Baumeister, Critique of the New Rule 1.99: Third-Party
Information Disclosure Procedure for Published Pre-Grant Applications, 83 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 381, 406 (2001).
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considered by an examiner. Purportedly keeping in line with
§ 122(c), the rule barred third parties from including with their
submitted patents or publications any explanation or other
60
information. It was, therefore, left to the examiner to determine
how, if at all, the submitted prior art was relevant to the pending
application.
In its continuing quest to minimize the issuance of invalid
61
patents, the Office justified its rulemaking as necessary to “improve
62
the quality of examination.” Because examiners’ increased exposure
to relevant prior art should lead to more effective examination, the
goal of Rule 99 was to harness the collective knowledge of the public
to bring that art to the attention of the Office, and ultimately, to
63
foster the issuance of only valid patents.
It is not obvious how Rule 99 can be reconciled with the
apparent congressional intent to restrict third-party involvement in
64
patent prosecution post-publication. For instance, the Office appears
to have drafted Rule 99 using the existing protest procedures as a
65
template, whereas Congress explicitly banned the use of protests
66
post-publication. Further, § 122(c)’s prohibition of any “other form
67
of pre-issuance opposition” suggests that Congress may have
intended a sweeping ban on third-party involvement. Under such an
interpretation of § 122(c), “any form of a complaint, objection, or
display of unwillingness to an idea or course of action whatsoever”
68
would be included in the terms “protest” and “opposition.” As one
commentator reasoned,
59. 37 C.F.R. § 1.99(d).
60. Id.
61. The Office’s protest procedure was justified on the same grounds. See Patent
Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 5588, 5589 (Jan. 28, 1977) (codified as
amended at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
62. Changes To Implement Eighteen-Month Publication of Patent Applications, 65 Fed.
Reg. 57,024, 57,043 (Sept. 20, 2000) (codified as amended at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
63. See id.; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1134.01 (8th ed., rev. 9, 2012) (explaining that the Office
allows the public to submit prior art “which [it] would discover on its own with an
ideal . . . search” to carry out its responsibility to issue only valid patents).
64. Cf. Baumeister, supra note 58, at 387 (“To stem any potential tide of post-publication
protest harassment by third parties, Congress included [§ 122(c)] within . . . the AIPA.”).
65. See id. at 388 (noting the nearly identical form and language between Rule 99 and Rule
291 as of 2001).
66. 35 U.S.C. § 122(c) (2006).
67. Id.
68. Baumeister, supra note 58, at 391.

TRZECIAK IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

9/18/2013 4:21 PM

REFORMING PREISSUANCE SUBMISSIONS

255

[S]ince the third party’s ultimate purpose of filing a [Rule 99]
submission is to provide the examiner with a prior art reference that
will tend to negate the patentability of the application’s claims, the
submission of any reference, even without the inclusion of additional
explanations or commentary, would itself inherently constitute a
complaint or objection to the granting of a patent on the application.
Thus, any submission of relevant prior art per se rises to the level of
69
a protest or opposition.

In response to a comment raising these objections during
rulemaking, the Office announced that it would not adopt such a
70
broad interpretation of § 122(c), but instead argued that “[a]
submission under [Rule 99] . . . is different from either an ‘opposition’
71
proceeding or a ‘protest’ that would fall under [that] provision[].”
The Office interpreted “opposition” not as it is commonly used by the
ordinary person, but rather as a specialized term of art, defined by
existing “opposition” procedures in the trademark realm and in
72
practice at foreign patent offices. Oppositions of this sort are
described as “complex” in nature, involving “full adversarial
proceedings similar to a trial, complete with pleadings, notice,
discovery, stipulations, motions, briefs, evidence, and opportunity for
73
oral argument.” Because the Office likened oppositions to inter
partes civil actions, the relatively detached nature of Rule 99
74
submissions rendered the two procedures easily distinguishable.
However, the mere fact that Rule 99 submissions were neither
complex nor involved did not alone clear them of the restrictions set
75
forth in § 122(c). Section 122(c) refers explicitly to protests, which
76
do not fall under the Office’s interpretation of “opposition.”
Undeterred, the Office argued that “a third-party submission of
77
patents and publications under [Rule 99 was] not a ‘protest.’” In
contrast to its treatment of the word “opposition,” the Office

69. Id.
70. See Changes To Implement Eighteen-Month Publication of Patent Applications, 65
Fed. Reg. 57,024, 57,042 (Sept. 20, 2000) (codified as amended at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 35 U.S.C. § 122(c) (2006).
76. For a description of the ex parte nature of protests, see supra notes 38–39.
77. Changes To Implement Eighteen-Month Publication of Patent Applications, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 57,042.
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interpreted “protest” based on that word’s definition as it is
78
“generally understood.” Consulting a dictionary, the Office defined
a protest as “a complaint, objection, or display of unwillingness
79
usually to an idea or course of action.” The Office adopted a
formalistic interpretation of “complaint or objection,” arguing that a
Rule 99 submission did not amount to either for two reasons. First,
the Office argued that the rule did not allow the submissions to
contain any form of adversarial arguments—only the prior art
80
documents themselves were permitted. Second, the Office argued
that “patents and publications [could have been] submitted for
various reasons,” not only by a person filing with the intention to foil
81
the application’s success.
The Office also contrasted Rule 99 submissions with the existing
82
protest procedures. The Office argued that unlike a protest under
Rule 291, a Rule 99 submission “does not permit the third party to
transmit any commentary or adversarial arguments objecting to a
83
patent application.” The Office also argued that the two procedures
were different because Rule 99 allowed only for submission of prior
84
art patents and publications, whereas Rule 291 protests allowed
submissions of any information related to a pending application’s
85
patentability.
Finally, the Office considered § 122(c) as a whole and interpreted
it “to mean that the Office is to ensure that no third party is given the
ability (or right) to have input on the examination of the application
86
after publication and argue against the application’s patentability.”
It argued that to conform to § 122(c), Rule 99 would “ensure that no
third parties enter written, adversarial arguments, thereby coloring

78. Id.
79. See id. (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 938 (10th ed. 1993)).
80. Id.
81. See id. (“Individuals may wish to submit patents or publications to help the examiner
understand the technology or the appropriate field of search.”).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id. (“Only patents and publications (i.e., prior art documents that are public
information that are theoretically available to the examiner and which the Office would
discover on its own in an ideal world) may be supplied to the examiner in a submission under
[Rule 99].”).
85. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.291(c) (2012) (“[A] protest must include . . . [a] copy of each listed
patent, publication, or other item of information . . . .”) (emphasis added).
86. Changes To Implement Eighteen-Month Publication of Patent Applications, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 57,043.
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87

the ex parte process.” To that end, the Office even refused to permit
third parties to mark or otherwise highlight their submitted prior-art
88
documents.
Despite the Office’s goal to provide for greater involvement by
89
third parties, the public likely never embraced Rule 99 submissions
90
to any great extent for several reasons. First, Rule 99 limited the
window of opportunity for third parties to submit prior art to only
91
two months following the application’s publication. Such a narrow
time frame required third parties to remain highly vigilant of Office
publications.
Second, Rule 99’s prohibition of accompanying explanatory
92
material also weakened the procedure’s appeal. Prior-art documents
submitted pursuant to Rule 99 were entered into the patent
93
application’s permanent file. In general, if a patentee is successful
during examination and ultimately obtains a patent, the patent “shall
94
be presumed valid” during subsequent litigation. Further, “a patent
is presumed to have overcome any references introduced during its
95
examination.” Therefore, any prior art submitted under Rule 99
instantly lost some of its potential to invalidate the patent in future
96
litigation.
Unlike during litigation, Rule 99 submitters were not allowed to
attach any commentary to their prior art, and therefore, submitters

87. Id.
88. Baumeister, supra note 58, at 400. Third parties could, however, submit redacted
versions of prior art documents, effectively highlighting the most relevant parts. See Changes To
Implement Eighteen-Month Publication of Patent Applications, 65 Fed. Reg. at 57,043. At least
one commentator has argued that there is little, if any, distinction between highlights or
markings for the purpose of emphasis and redacted copies, and that such a broad interpretation
of § 122(c) “would cast upon the legitimacy of Rule 99 in toto.” See Baumeister, supra note 58,
at 401 (“The only real reason a third party would file a [Rule 99] submission at all is exactly the
same as the reason for highlighting the references contained therein: to inform the examiner of
particular disclosures that cast doubt upon the validity of a given application’s claims.”).
89. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
90. See Matthew John Duane, Lending A Hand: The Need for Public Participation in
Patent Examination and Beyond, 7 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 57, 63 (2008). As with data on
protests, the Office did not release statistics on Rule 99 submission rates.
91. 37 C.F.R. § 1.99(e) (2011).
92. Id. § 1.99(d).
93. Id. § 1.99(a).
94. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2006).
95. Duane, supra note 90, at 63 (citing Gould v. Gen. Photonics Corp., 534 F. Supp. 399,
400 (N.D. Cal. 1982)).
96. Id.
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risked the possibility that examiners would overlook or misconstrue
97
their submission’s relevance to the application. Assuming that most
would-be Rule 99 submitters were competitors of the applicants, they
were likely not eager to show their cards without supporting
commentary and, thereby, potentially compromise what might
98
otherwise be strong litigation material.
Ultimately, Rule 99 was replaced in September 2012 with an
99
expanded version of essentially the same rule. The following section
discusses that transition.
C. Congressional Amendment of § 122(e)
With the weaknesses of the Rule 99 submissions in mind, some
commentators proposed that the procedures for preissuance
submissions should be amended to allow for greater participation by
100
third parties. Because competitors and otherwise-interested third
parties collectively constitute a vast resource of knowledge regarding
prior art, these proposals argued that a mechanism for harnessing that
101
resource should better incentivize third-party action.
Under one commentator’s proposal, third parties would be
102
allowed to submit “all types of information,” not merely prior art.
Also, third parties would be allowed to supplement their submissions
103
with “a brief statement of relevancy for all information submitted.”
Such a proposal would “improve[] the quality of information
submitted and decrease[] the burden on [the Office] to independently
104
establish relevancy.” This proposal would also directly address

97. Id.
98. See id.
99. See Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,150, 42,173 (July 17, 2012) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.290).
100. See, e.g., Kevin Mack, Reforming Inequitable Conduct To Improve Patent Quality:
Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 169–70 (2006); see also FED. TRADE
COMM’N, supra note 26, at 18 (“Some urged that pre-grant opposition would have the
advantage of introducing third-party participation before the PTO is on record with a position,
thereby avoiding any undue tendency to affirm prior acts.”).
101. See Mack, supra note 100, at 169.
102. Id. at 170. For a list of some hypothetical examples of non-prior-art submissions, see
infra notes 180–87 and accompanying text.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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submitters’ fears that their submissions would be weakened and
105
potentially compromised without the possibility for explanation.
Concerns about the underutilization of Rule 99 submissions
ultimately gained the attention of Congress. On June 8, 2005,
Representative Lamar Smith introduced the Patent Reform Act of
106
2005 (the 2005 Act), which included, among other important patent
107
reforms, an expansion of the ability of third parties to submit prior
108
art to pending application files. In pertinent part, the 2005 Act
proposed amending § 122 to allow for anonymous, third-party
preissuance submissions of patents or publications “of potential
relevance to the examination of the application” submitted before the
examiner’s first rejection of that application, but not before six
109
months after the application’s publication. In its most significant
departure from Rule 99, the proposed amendment to § 122(e)
required that third parties include with their submissions “a concise
110
description of the asserted relevance of each submitted document.”
111
However, the 2005 Act failed to be enacted.
Two years later, proponents of patent reform introduced a
112
similar bill, the Patent Reform Act of 2007 (the 2007 Act), which
113
included a nearly identical preissuance-submissions provision. A
report from the Committee on the Judiciary on the 2007 Act (the
2007 Committee Report) provided some insight into Congress’s
114
rationale for the amendment to § 122(e). The 2007 Committee
Report cited growing concerns about “the quality of issued
115
patents . . . in recent years.” It noted that “patents have issued on
105. See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text.
106. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
107. Billed as “without question, the most comprehensive change to U.S. patent law since
Congress passed the 1952 Patent Act,” the 2005 Act proposed a change of application priority
from first-to-invent to first-to-file, deleted the “best mode” disclosure requirement, and created
a new post-grant opposition procedure. Press Release, Congressman Lamar Smith, Smith
Introduces Patent Reform Bill (June 8, 2005), available at http://web.archive.org/web/
20060927203732/http://lamarsmith.house.gov/News.asp?FormMode=Detail&ID=669.
108. H.R. 2795 § 10.
109. Id.
110. Id.
th
111. H.R. 2795 (109 ): Patent Act of 2005, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/109/hr2795 (last visited Aug. 3, 2013).
112. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
113. See id. § 9. However, the new version also required third parties to “identify the real
party-in-interest making the submission.” Id.
114. H.R. Rep. No. 110-314 (2007).
115. Id. at 36–37.
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inventions that were publically known and in use prior to the filing of
116
the applications” especially in “newer areas of technology.” In these
areas, patent examiners have struggled to locate “all of the prior art
117
that exists in those fields.” To remedy this problem, the drafters
sought to amend § 122(e) “to allow third parties to submit prior art
that may be known to the public, but not readily available to the
118
examiner.”
Importantly, the 2007 Act did not propose to repeal the § 122(c)
ban on pre-grant protests and oppositions. The 2007 Committee
Report acknowledged that Rule 99’s limiting conditions on
submissions (the narrow two-month window of submission
acceptance and the prohibition on accompanying explanations) were
119
designed to comply with § 122(c). By amending § 122(e) but
“leaving § 122(c) intact,” the drafters of the 2007 Act intended to
“include broader circumstances under which third parties may submit
prior art in a published application” without “allow[ing] for
additional third party input that would amount to a protest or pre120
By requiring submitters to “include an
issuance opposition.”
explanation of the relevance of the prior art,” the drafters sought
both “to assist the examiner in focusing on the relevant information”
and to “reduce the likelihood that a third party [would] submit large
121
numbers of irrelevant or cumulative references.” Although the 2007
Act was passed by the House of Representatives on September 7,
2007, it failed to win the support of the Senate and was ultimately
122
abandoned.
On January 25, 2011, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced yet
another iteration of patent reform, the AIA. Finally, both the House
and the Senate passed their respective versions of this bill, and
President Barack Obama signed the measure into law on September

116. Id. The 2007 Committee Report identified software and business method patents as
those most susceptible to examiner error, in part because “those areas do not have a welldeveloped tradition of, or system for, publication in readily searchable printed journals.” Id. at
37.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. H.R. 1908 (110th): Patent Reform Act of 2007, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/110/hr1908 (last visited Aug. 3, 2013).
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123

16, 2011. The AIA codified the oft-proposed amendment to
124
§ 122(e). Under the law, “[a]ny third party may submit for
consideration and inclusion in the record of a patent application, any
patent, published patent application, or other printed publication of
potential relevance” before the later of six months from the date the
application is published or the date of the examiner’s first rejection of
125
any claim. The law contains no requirement that the submitter
identify the real party in interest behind the submission and mandates
that all submissions must “set forth a concise description of the
126
asserted relevance of each submitted document.”
D. The Office Promulgates Rule 290 Pursuant to Amended § 122(e)
On July 17, 2012, the Office abandoned Rule 99 and
promulgated a new regulation providing for preissuance submissions
127
by third parties pursuant to the AIA. New 37 C.F.R. § 1.290 (Rule
290), titled “[s]ubmissions by third parties in applications,” went into
effect on September 16, 2012, and “appl[ies] to any application filed
128
before, on, or after” that date.
The Office embraced the new changes set forth in the AIA as an
opportunity to broadly expand upon the ability of third parties to
129
assist patent examiners during an examination in three ways. First,
the Office interpreted § 122(e) to allow third parties to submit almost
any printed publications to the examination of an application, not just
130
those that are prior art. Amended § 122(e) provides, “[a]ny third

123. See H.R. 1249 (112th): Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr1249 (last visited Aug. 3, 2013) (noting that the
House version of the Act passed on June 23, 2011); S. 23 (112th): America Invents Act,
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s23 (last visited Aug. 3, 2013) (noting
that the Senate version of the Act passed on March 8, 2011).
124. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 8, 125 Stat. 284, 315 (2011) (to
be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122(e)).
125. Id. (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122(e)(1)).
126. See id. (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122(e)(2)(A)).
127. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,150, 42,173 (July 17, 2012) (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. § 1.290).
128. Id. at 42,150.
129. Perhaps the Office’s new rule has impermissibly surpassed the intent of Congress with
respect to both § 122(e) and § 122(c). See infra Part II.
130. See Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,154. (“Because . . . § 122(e) does not
limit the type of information that may be submitted to only that which is prior art, there is no
requirement in [Rule 290] that the information submitted be prior art . . . .”).
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party may submit . . . any patent, published patent application, or
other printed publication of potential relevance to the examination of
131
the application.” To that end, Rule 290 merely requires that the
documents qualify as “printed publications” under the definition set
forth in § 2128 of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
132
(MPEP). According to the MPEP, a “printed publication” is
133
broadly defined as any reference that “is accessible to the public.”
However, to weed out any “improper attempt by the third party to
impermissibly participate in the examination of the application,” the
Office cautioned that submitted documents that appear to have been
“drafted after the application was filed solely to contest patentability”
134
may not be accepted.
135
Second, pursuant to amended § 122(e), Rule 290 requires third
parties to provide a “concise description of the asserted relevance of
136
each item” submitted. These descriptions are required to contain at
least some substance: Rule 290 provides that, “[a]t a minimum, [the
description] must be more than a bare statement that the document is
137
relevant” and that it instead must be “meaningful.” By contrast,
under Rule 99, third parties were prohibited from including any
138
markings or explanations on their submitted documents. Therefore,
even if third parties had been allowed to submit non-prior-art
documents under that rule, those submissions likely would have been
ambiguous or otherwise unhelpful to examiners without any
139
clarification.
Under Rule 290, however, even vague submissions of any variety
become much more powerful now that submitters are able to assert

131. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 8, 125 Stat. at 316 (to be
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122(e)).
132. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,154 (citing U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, supra note 63, § 2128).
133. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 63, § 2128.
134. See Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,163.
135. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 8, 125 Stat. at 316 (to be
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122(e)).
136. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,173.
137. Id. at 42,156.
138. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
139. In such a case, examiners would be left guessing to where in the often many-page
application the submitter is referring.

TRZECIAK IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

9/18/2013 4:21 PM

REFORMING PREISSUANCE SUBMISSIONS

263

an association between the submission and a specific part of the
application. The Office has stated that it is interpreting the concise
description-of-relevance requirement “liberally because [it]
anticipates that third parties will be motivated to . . . effectively draw
the examiner’s attention to the potential relevance of a submitted
140
document.” Rule 290 suggests that “a narrative description or a
claim chart,” in which various portions of a submitted document are
“mapped”—or assigned—to different claim elements in the
141
application, would be acceptable.
Third, Rule 290 expands upon the ability of third parties to assist
patent examiners by reducing submission cost barriers. While the
Office had previously charged third parties a processing fee for
142
submitted documents under Rule 99, Rule 290 retains the old fee
structure but provides an exemption for the first three documents
submitted by any party (or a party in privity with that party) in any
143
given application. The Office reasoned that the “submission of a
limited number of documents is more likely to assist in the
examination process and thus offset the cost of processing the
144
submission.” Even if the $180 processing fee had not been a major
deterrent for competitive submitters under Rule 99, this fee waiver
should make Rule 290 a viable procedure for disinterested third
parties, such as students, who otherwise might not be inclined to
145
spend more than their time assisting in patent examination.
In sum, Rule 290 replaces Rule 99 with a much more attractive
146
procedure for third parties to cheaply and anonymously submit any
147
published documents relevant to an invention’s patentability.
However, despite Rule 290’s benefits, its expansive nature leads it to
conflict with the § 122(c) ban on preissuance opposition, making
further change necessary to eliminate the tension between § 122(c)
140. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,156 (emphasis added).
141. Id.
142. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
143. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,153.
144. Id.
145. For further discussion on disinterested submitters, see infra notes 162–65 and
accompanying text.
146. While the party in interest may remain anonymous, that party’s submitting agent will
be identified. Rule 290 requires signed statements by the submitter that the submission is in
compliance with the rule. See id. at 42,154 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.290(d)(5), (g)).
147. See id. (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.290).
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and § 122(e) and to further encourage third-party participation in
patent prosecution.
II. THE PROHIBITION ON PRE-GRANT, THIRD-PARTY ARGUMENTS
SHOULD BE CURTAILED
148

Because Rule 290 went into effect on September 16, 2012, time
will tell whether the new procedure will be more widely embraced
than its predecessor. Despite the apparent advantages over the old
system, some commentators are not optimistic that the changes are
149
drastic enough to adequately encourage competitive participation.
One commentator has simply argued that “even if submission
practice is improved” over Rule 99, “[t]he small possibility of
stopping a patent ‘on the cheap’ does not provide much incentive to
150
study applications as they are published.”
Thus, to address these concerns and foster greater third-party
participation, Congress should recognize that even the new procedure
enables enough third-party involvement that it already conflicts with
§ 122(c)’s prohibition on pre-grant protests and opposition. Congress
should amend § 122(c) to relieve this tension and permit third parties
to supplement their submitted references with direct arguments
explaining how those references render the application unpatentable.
This way, from the perspective of potential submitters, there is less
risk that examiners will fail to fully recognize the value of submitted
references.
A. Lifting the Ban on Third-Party Preissuance Argumentation Would
Eliminate the Tension Between § 122(c) and § 122(e).
As a relatively small provision largely overshadowed by the more
significant and controversial patent reforms enacted through the
151
AIA, the “Preissuance Submissions” amendment to § 122(e) has
152
not raised many suspicious eyebrows. To the contrary, many have

148. Id. at 42,150.
149. See, e.g., Bezos, supra note 22, § 14.39.
150. Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1559, 1573 (2006).
151. The AIA also changes patent awarding priority from first-to-invent to first-to-file, see
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011), and
establishes new post-grant opposition proceedings, see id. § 6.
152. See James G. McEwen, Is the Cure Worse than the Disease? An Overview of the Patent
Reform Act of 2005, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 55, 72 (2005) (“Because this
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applauded the amendment as a step in the right direction for
153
improving the quality of issued patents. However, this Note argues
that although the AIA’s allowance of increased third-party
participation in patent prosecution was sound in policy, it nonetheless
has led the Office to violate § 122(c)’s overly restrictive ban on
preissuance opposition.
1. Even the Office’s Prior Rule 99 Submission Procedure
Arguably Violated § 122(c). Rule 290 is merely the latest in a series of
attempts by the Office to push the boundaries of § 122(c). The Office
first chipped away at the statutory ban on preissuance opposition by
establishing the Rule 99 third-party submissions procedure almost
immediately after Congress enacted § 122(c). At that time, the Office
argued that Rule 99 submissions did not violate § 122(c) because the
154
submissions amounted to neither a protest nor an opposition.
However, even then the Office may have interpreted § 122(c) too
narrowly for two reasons.
First, the Office argued that § 122(c)’s ban on “protest[s] or other
155
form[s] of pre-issuance opposition” applied only to “protest[s]” and
“opposition[s]” as they are separately understood in the patent
156
industry.
The Office defined an “opposition” narrowly as a
complex, inter partes procedure similar to civil litigation in federal
157
court. However, § 122(c) explicitly bars any “protest or other form
158
of pre-issuance opposition,” indicating that protests are intended to
159
be an example of preissuance opposition. Because a protest allows
only very limited third-party participation, it cannot be characterized
improvement in patent quality is a generally acknowledged goal, this passage has not generated
a great deal of controversy.”).
153. See id.; Dylan M. Aste, To Disclose or Not To Disclose: Why the United States Properly
Adopted the European Model for Third-Party Participation During Patent Prosecution, 3 CASE
W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 153, 181–85 (2012) (arguing that increased third-party
participation in patent prosecution should result in fewer invalid patents, less litigation, and
stronger patent applications).
154. See supra notes 70–88 and accompanying text.
155. 35 U.S.C. § 122(c) (2006).
156. See supra notes 70–88 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
158. 35 U.S.C. § 122(c) (emphasis added).
159. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:17 (7th ed. 2007) (“Where general words follow specific
words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects
similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.” (citations
omitted)).
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as a complex opposition procedure of the type described by the
160
Office. Therefore, § 122(c) should be interpreted to ban postpublication, preissuance protests and other third-party antagonism
that resembles a protest. Especially because the format and language
161
of Rule 99 strongly resemble those of Rule 291 protests, it is
possible that Rule 99 would have been invalid under this
interpretation.
Second, the Office’s argument that Rule 99 submissions were not
antagonistic in nature because the “patents and publications [could
162
have been] submitted for various reasons” is unpersuasive. The
Office postulated that “[i]ndividuals may wish to submit patents or
publications to help the examiner understand the technology or the
163
appropriate field of search.” Although there exist no available
statistics on the use of Rule 99, there is indeed evidence supporting
the prediction that some disinterested third parties are willing to track
applications and submit prior art. For instance, in 2007, the Center for
Patent Innovations at New York Law School began a two-year Peer
To Patent pilot program, providing an Internet forum for third parties
to discuss and collectively submit publications to select pending
164
applications.
The pilot program attracted 2,800 participant
165
reviewers, 686 of whom became “active” on the site. Of those active
reviewers, 108 identified their interest in participating as either
“[p]ersonal,” “[c]ontributing to the issuance of quality patents,” or
166
“[contributing] to patent reform.” While a plurality identified their
interests as “[p]rofessional,” only three active reviewers explicitly
stated that they were primarily motivated by “[c]ompetitive
167
interests.”
The success of the Peer To Patent pilot program demonstrated
that some third parties are sufficiently motivated to monitor and
engage new applications without a direct financial interest in the
160. For a description of the ex parte nature of protests, see supra notes 38–39 and
accompanying text.
161. Baumeister, supra note 58, at 388.
162. Changes To Implement Eighteen-Month Publication of Patent Applications, 65 Fed.
Reg. 57,024, 57,042 (Sept. 20, 2000) (codified as amended at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
163. Id.
164. CTR. FOR PATENT INNOVATIONS, N.Y. LAW SCH., PEER TO PATENT: FIRST PILOT
FINAL RESULTS 4–5 (2012), available at http://dl.dropbox.com/u/2541719/First%20Pilot%
20Final%20Results.pdf.
165. Id. at 24.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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outcome. However, although many third parties will likely continue
to participate using the now-effective Rule 290, it seems intuitive that
financially interested parties will consititute a greater portion of the
168
participants now that the procedure is permanent. Also, even those
submitters whose motivations are purely altruistic typically will be
169
adverse to the applicant. Because a patent confers upon its owner
an economic monopoly, both competitors and the public at large
benefit from, and are motivated to ensure, appropriately narrow
170
patents.
2. The Inconsistent Application of § 122(c) To Ban Protests but
Not Preissuance Submissions Is Unprincipled. Although the Office
arguably transgressed § 122(c) by adopting Rule 99, it firmly asserted
at that time that a submission would violate that statute if the
submission included any non-prior-art references or contained any
171
explanation. But in 2011, Congress tossed the Office into an
impossible interpretive quagmire when it amended § 122(e) and
allowed third-party submissions of any publications and
172
accompanying descriptions of relevance. Tasked with promulgating
a rule that directly violated even its narrow interpretation of § 122(c),
the Office was left splitting hairs in carving out Rule 290 preissuance
submissions from the ban on protests. The Office directly addressed
168. The majority of the listed motivations of Peer To Patent active participants, including
those most frequently self-reported (“Professional” and “Contributing to the issuance of quality
patents”), see id., are notably ambiguous regarding financial interest. Further, some less
ambiguously altruistic interests (“Contribute to patent reform” and “Ensure long-term
commitment from [the Office] for public participation”), see id., are arguably less applicable
now that the sought reform—the amendment to § 122(e) and a robust Rule 290—has been
achieved. See id. at 33 (describing the then-pending legislation as a plausible means to reward
only meritorious patents “as illustrated by the success of Peer To Patent”).
169. Because “[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless” the invention has been
disclosed in the prior art, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006), there is virtually no submission of prior art that
can aid an applicant in obtaining a patent for his originally filed claims. Even submissions that
serve only to direct an examiner to the appropriate field of search will have played an
antagonistic role if the examiner’s search leads to invalidating prior art. There is one small
exception, however. Prior art references that “teach away,” or suggest that the claimed
invention is impractical or implausible, may be used to rebut a prima facie showing that the
invention is obvious. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 63, § 2145(X)(D).
170. Thomas Jefferson, administrator of the early U.S. patent system, viewed patent
monopolies as an evil necessary to incentivize innovation. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, 7–11 (1966). Jefferson sought to ensure that only inventions that “were new and useful”
received “the special inducement of a limited monopoly.” Id. at 9.
171. See supra notes 82–88 and accompanying text.
172. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 8, 125 Stat. 284, 315–16 (2011)
(to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122(e)).
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this issue during rulemaking with three main arguments in response
to comments questioning the overlap between protests and Rule 290
173
submissions.
First, the Office argued that, although Rule 290 was created
pursuant to § 122(e), protests are “supported by a separate statutory
provision, [§ 122(c)], which implies the availability of submitting a
174
protest in an application prior to publication.” This argument is
misleading because the Office invented the protest procedure in
175
176
1977, long before § 122(c) was codified in 1999. Thus, § 122(c)
does not “support” protests, but rather it limits them to the prepublication time period—just as it limits any other procedure that
177
amounts to preissuance opposition, arguably including Rule 290.
Second, the Office reasoned that unlike Rule 290 submissions,
protests permit “the submission of information other than
publications, including any facts or information adverse to
178
patentability.”
However, the Office’s liberal interpretation of
“printed publications” under Rule 290 minimizes this distinction
179
between protests and submissions. The Office suggested that Rule
290 submissions “could include litigation papers and court documents

173. See Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submission by Third Parties Provision of
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,150, 42,151 (July 17, 2012) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
174. Id.
175. See Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 5588, 5589 (Jan. 28, 1977)
(codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (establishing the protest).
176. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, tit. IV, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-552 (1999) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 122). Admittedly, § 122 does distinguish
between protests and preissuance submissions by name, though it is silent on the material
differences between them.
177. One could argue that § 122(e) preissuance submissions are also restricted by § 122(c),
and therefore, that Congress intended those submissions be allowed only when the submitter
had received the express consent of the applicant. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(c) (mandating that postpublication opposition is not allowed “without the express written consent of the applicant”).
While this interpretation is not a strong one, § 122(c) probably would still prohibit a
hypothetical opposition rulemaking that is only thinly veiled as pursuant to § 122(e). See
Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submission by Third Parties Provision of the LeahySmith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,156 (“[Rule 290] should not be interpreted as
permitting a third party to participate in the prosecution of an application, as [§ 122(c)]
prohibits the initiation of a protest or other form of pre-issuance opposition . . . .”).
178. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submission by Third Parties Provision of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,151. For example, one might submit a
protest containing documents that are not publically available or were created solely to contest
patentability.
179. See supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text.
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180

not subject to a court-imposed protective or secrecy order.” Such an
expansive definition of admissible “printed publications” allows a
savvy third party to raise any objection to a pending application’s
181
patentability. For example, one could submit a page of a dictionary
182
if one believes a term in the application’s claims is indefinite. One
could submit a copy of the landmark Federal Circuit case, In re
183
Wands, to suggest that the application’s specification would not
184
enable a person skilled in the art to use the invention. Or, one could
submit a patent examiner’s rejection memo found in a similar
185
application file if one believed the instant application could be
rejected on analogous grounds. Taken to the limits of what is
acceptable, one could submit even relevant sections of either the
186
187
MPEP
or the U.S. Code
pertaining to patent-validity
requirements.
Also, the new rule does allow submissions of some information in
addition to the information contained in the references. Rule 290
allows parties to submit “documents that are cumulative of each
other” because “the description of relevance may provide additional
information with respect to the document such that the submission [as
188
a whole] is not cumulative of information already of record.”

180. See Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision of
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,154.
181. Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Pre-Issuance Submissions, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 15,
2012, 10:30 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/09/pre-issuance-submissions.html.
182. See id. Indefiniteness is grounds for claim rejection. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2006)
(“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the
invention.”).
183. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
184. See id. at 737 (providing a litany of factors for courts and examiners to consider when
deciding whether the application satisfies the enablement requirement). Insufficient enablement
is another ground for rejection. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2006).
185. Correspondence between examiners and applicants, including examiner rejection
memos, are published online at the Office’s website in its “Patent Application Information
Retrieval” database, the same location where the Office publishes new applications. See U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, PAIR Resources, USPTO.GOV,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/status/private_pair/index.jsp (last visited Aug. 3, 2013).
186. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 63, §§ 2103–2190 (providing an
examiner’s guide to patentability rejections).
187. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (constituting the statutory bases underlying the many
patent validity criteria).
188. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submission by Third Parties Provision of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,150, 42,154–55 (July 17, 2012) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.290).
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Therefore, if the same submitted publication can have a different
impact on an application’s patentability depending only on its
description of relevance, then that description must carry at least
some weight as substantive information.
Third and principally, the Office argued that protests are
different from Rule 290 submissions because protests allow for
189
arguments against patentability. Rule 290 submissions, on the other
hand, do not allow third parties to “propose rejections of the claims
190
Highlighting the distinction in the
or set forth arguments.”
regulations, the Office noted that protests require a “concise
explanation of the relevance” of submitted references whereas Rule
191
290 requires a “concise description of the asserted relevance.”
This relatively insignificant difference in regulatory language
should not be relied upon as the divergence between the two
procedures. In fact, the Office itself once supported this view; in its
192
notice of proposed rulemaking for Rule 290, the Office originally
planned to amend the Rule 291 protest language “to change
193
‘explanation’ to ‘description’ to conform to proposed” Rule 290.
The Office proposed that such an amendment “would clarify that
there is no difference between the concise description of relevance for
a third-party preissuance submission and the concise description of
194
relevance for a protest.” Only after comments suggested that this
proposed amendment caused “some confusion” did the Office adopt
195
its current position that the two are different.
Despite its change of course with respect to the finalized
formulation of Rule 290, the Office struggled to remain consistent in
its distinction between an explanation and a description. For example,
Rule 290 states that the concise description should “explain to the
196
examiner the relevance of the document.” Additionally, the Office
was not alone in conflating the words “description” and

189. Id. at 42,151.
190. Id. at 42,156.
191. Id. at 42,151 (emphases added).
192. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submission by Third Parties Provision of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 448 (proposed Jan. 5, 2012) (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
193. Id. at 454 (emphasis added).
194. Id. (emphasis added).
195. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submission by Third Parties Provision of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,151.
196. Id. at 42,156.
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“explanation.” Reporting on the proposed 2007 Act, which similarly
provided that third parties must “set forth a concise description of the
197
asserted relevance of each submitted document,” the Committee on
the Judiciary wrote that each submitted document must “include an
198
explanation of [its] relevance.” Clarifying further, the Committee
Report stated, “[T]he submitter must explain how the reference
199
pertains to the invention claimed in the published application.”
While defenders might consider the distinction in regulatory
language between descriptions and explanations to be merely
symbolic of underlying substantive differences, there are at least three
reasons why Rule 290 submissions may amount to rejection proposals
or other arguments against patentability. First, for example, consider
the Office’s suggestion that a description of relevance could include a
claim chart mapping the submitted publication to specific claims in
200
the application. The Office cautioned that Rule 290 “is not an
201
invitation . . . to propose rejections.” But if a third party submits a
prior-art reference and connects it to a specific claim in the pending
application, that party is, for all practical purposes, proposing a priorart-based rejection of that claim.
Second, a concise description of relevance can function as an
argument against patentability. As one federal judge interpreted the
nearly identical proposed preissuance submission language in the
2005 Act, the procedure “giv[es] a chance for the person who submits
the pre-issuance submission to give his or her written argument as to
202
its relevance.” Further, the Office has recognized that “a third party
203
might assert that a particular [submitted] document is prior art.” In
fact, the Office requires that concise descriptions comprise more than
204
mere highlights, annotations, or form paragraphs. Thus, parties
must describe with detail the relevance of each submitted document
such that each description inevitably amounts to an argument.

197. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 9 (2007) (emphasis added).
198. H.R. Rep. No.110-314, at 36–37 (2007) (emphasis added).
199. Id. (emphasis added).
200. See Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submission by Third Parties Provision of
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,156.
201. Id.
202. Robert M.M. Seto, A Federal Judge’s View of the Most Important Changes in Patent
Law in Half-A-Century, 11 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 141, 175 (2006) (emphasis added).
203. Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submission by Third Parties Provision of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,163 (emphasis added).
204. See id. at 42,164.
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It follows that an argument as to a document’s relevance to a
pending application is equivalently an argument as to how the
document bears on the application’s patentability. Because any
document that bears on patentability necessarily either supports or
opposes the application, it is not difficult to extend the logical chain
one link further and equate the submission and description as a whole
with an indirect argument simply supporting or opposing
patentability.
It is telling that the Office has not capped the acceptable length
205
of a concise description
but has vaguely warned that those
“approach[ing] the length of the [submitted publications] themselves
206
will not likely be considered ‘concise.’” In fact, the statutory term
“concise” has been rendered almost meaningless in at least one other
207
area of administrative law. The Administrative Procedure Act
requires that agencies promulgating final rules—for example, the
Office’s Rule 290—“incorporate . . . a concise general statement of
208
[the rules’] basis and purpose.” Despite the qualifier of “concise,”
the strict judicial doctrine of hard look review for agency rulemaking
has led agencies to be “detailed and encyclopedic” in their
209
statements, which sometimes reach hundreds of pages in length. As
an example, the Office’s Rule 290 statement is composed of roughly
210
28,000 words.
Therefore, if third parties are similarly given
substantial leeway with the length of their concise descriptions of
relevance, they could provide detailed arguments to patent
examiners.
Third, some newly permissible types of submitted publications
may themselves include arguments of the sort prohibited in their
accompanying descriptions of relevance. The Office largely
anticipated this issue by warning against the submission of printed
publications that were published solely to contest a particular patent

205. See id. (“[W]hile third parties should refrain from submitting verbose descriptions of
relevance, . . . the Office has not established an upper limit on the size of a concise description at
this time.”).
206. Id. at 42,156.
207. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006).
208. Id. § 553(c).
209. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the
Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1500 (2012).
210. See generally Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submission by Third Parties
Provision of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,150.
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211

application. However, some publications falling outside the scope of
that exception may contain relevant arguments and thus might be
used strategically to that effect. For example, the patent-validity
arguments in published litigation briefs or examiner rejection memos
that address inventions similar to those under review might be
applicable to the instant applications. Or, query the admissibility of a
printed publication that was purportedly created for multiple
purposes—for instance, a hypothetical publication that uses a pending
application as a case study within a larger work lamenting poor claim
drafting. The current rule leads to a strange result: the permissibility
of argumentative publications depends only on the timing and
purpose of publication.
B. Lifting the Ban Would Serve the Policy Objectives Underlying
§ 122(e) Without Causing Harassment or Delay to Applicants.
To be sure, significant differences remain between protests and
preissuance submissions. While Rule 290 submissions may often rise
to the level of argumentation and thus violate § 122(c), the
submissions cannot be nearly as argumentative as protests. Pursuant
to Rule 290, third parties must couch their arguments against
patentability either as arguments as to the relevance of submitted
212
publications or through other indirect and crafty means. Once they
have provided a statement of relevance, submitters must rely upon
the examiner to independently derive direct arguments against
patentability from each submission. Knowing that an issued patent is
presumed to have overcome any prior art known to the examiner,
213
many competitors may remain reluctant to submit anything,
especially when they are prohibited from providing their own direct
arguments against patentability. Therefore, a legislative relaxation of
this prohibition likely would better incentivize competitor

211. Id. at 42,163.
212. See supra Part II.A.2.
213. See Bezos, supra note 22, § 14:39 (noting that potential submitters may choose to avoid
the risk of hampering future litigation by “gold plating” patent applications with their
submissions); Timothy Bechen & Alison McGeary, Changes in Pre-Grant and Post-Grant
Challenges at the U.S. Patent Office (USPTO), WILLAMS MULLEN (Sept. 15, 2011),
http://www.williamsmullen.com/news/changes-pre-grant-and-post-grant-challenges-us-patentoffice-uspto (“While [Rule 290] increases the window for, and scope of, third party submissions
during examination, issues remain as to whether it is advisable to prepare such submissions due
to the deference that can be given to [the Office] examination and the potential prejudice to
raising the same prior art in a later proceeding.”).
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participation, ultimately resulting in the Office’s issuance of fewer
invalid patents.
The policy goal motivating § 122(e) was the expansion of
examiner awareness of prior art that otherwise would be known only
214
Potential increases in disinterested party
to a select few.
participation notwithstanding, the overarching drawback to Rule 99
from the perspective of competitors—that art submitted during
prosecution could be used against submitters during later validity
215
proceedings —remains largely applicable to Rule 290. Accordingly,
one commentator has predicted:
[F]or all of the efforts to make the submission process more
accessible to the public and increase the quality of examination
through the citation of relevant art, the use of this process will likely
be significantly limited. The risk of hampering future proceedings by
essentially “gold plating” a patent that issues from an application
subjected to the third-party submission process will likely detract
many potential submitters, or at least make it unlikely that the best
216
art will be cited.

While these concerns about “gold plating” suggest that
competitors might never choose to submit prior art regardless of any
ability to submit direct arguments, these concerns should not be
overstated. A gold plate is not an estoppel provision. The Federal
Circuit emphasized this point in 2012 in Sciele Pharma Inc. v. Lupin
217
Ltd. The court held that during litigation, “there is no heightened or
added burden that applies to invalidity defenses that are based upon
references that were before the [Office]. The burden is always the
218
same, clear and convincing evidence.” Instead, the court reasoned,
“it may be harder to meet the . . . burden [using] the same argument
219
on the same reference that the [Office] already considered.” The
fact of whether evidence had been considered by the Office goes to
220
the weight of that evidence during litigation. However, district court
judges are under no legal obligation to instruct juries that the burden
214. See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text.
216. Bezos, supra note 22, § 14:39.
217. Sciele Pharma Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., 684 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
218. Id. at 1260.
219. Id. Despite this heightened practical difficulty, the court resolved the case in the
defendant’s favor, finding that two prior art references that had been before the Office now
“raised a substantial question of validity.” Id. at 1261–62.
220. Id. at 1260.
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may be more easily carried when challengers produce references that
221
the Office did not consider.
Contrast the relatively lax judicial prejudice against examinerconsidered prior art in Lupin with the harsh estoppel provisions
222
embedded within the Office’s new post-grant review procedure.
223
Post-grant review, another creation of the AIA, is a procedure by
which third parties may challenge the validity of an issued patent
224
within the nine months following its issuance. Challengers may
argue any grounds for invalidity and submit supporting patents,
publications, and other relevant information to be considered by the
225
Director. If, based on the submitted evidence, the Director decides
to institute a review and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board goes on
to issue a final written decision, the challenger is estopped from
226
challenging the same claims in future proceedings or litigation.
Thus, not only is the challenger estopped from reusing particular
prior art references in later challenges, but that party, or any other
party in privity with that party, is also prohibited from challenging the
same claims “on any ground that the [challenger] raised or reasonably
227
could have raised.” As the Federal Circuit in Lupin highlighted, no
such estoppel surrounds prior art merely because it was previously
228
considered by an examiner.
Further moderating the futility concerns is evidence that some
interested parties would be willing to submit prior art to pending
applications even under the current rules. The Peer To Patent pilot
program, like current Rule 290, allowed community members to
review applications and submit prior art to examiners with
229
annotations explaining the prior art’s relevance. While only three

221. See Z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 507 F.3d 1340, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding
that a jury instruction regarding the burden of proof on invalidity might lead to juror confusion).
222. Compare Lupin, 685 F.3d at 1260, with Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 308 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)).
223. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. at 305–11 (2011)
(to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329).
224. Id. at 306 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 321).
225. Id. at 306, 310 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–322, 328).
226. Id. at 308 (to be codified at § 325(e)).
227. Id.
228. See Sciele Pharma Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., 684 F.3d 1253, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“In short,
there is no heightened or added burden that applies to invalidity defenses that are based upon
references that were before the . . . Office.”).
229. CTR. FOR PATENT INNOVATIONS, supra note 164, at 4–5. In compliance with § 122(c),
the Peer To Patent pilot program acquired consent from participating applicants. Id. at 4.
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“active reviewers” identified their interests in participating as
230
“[c]ompetitive,” 117 stated their interests were “[p]rofessional.”
The top-submitting reviewer, for example, with “124 prior art
contributions for 82 applications” over the course of the pilot, was a
231
software developer working for IBM.
Especially in light of the Peer To Patent pilot program’s
232
success, it is reasonable to predict that allowing submitters to
provide direct arguments against patentability would further
incentivize participation. Because parties with competitive interests
are in an excellent position to provide examiners with the mostrelevant prior art, a boost in their participation would effectively
233
carry out the policy goals of § 122(e). Further, third parties’ direct
arguments against patentability could provide examiners with
potentially strong suggestions that might otherwise be overlooked
234
until the patent is challenged in court.
Other commentators have previously argued that § 122(c) should
be amended to provide third parties with greater opportunity to
235
participate in prosecution.
Undoubtedly, Congress has been
reluctant to take that measure because of widespread fears that third
236
parties could then harass applicants or delay prosecution. Some
independent inventors have even expressed concern in the past that

230. Id. at 24.
231. Id. at 30, 37.
232. See id. at 24 (“The number of active reviewers nearly doubled in the first two years of
the pilot, going from 365 to 686.”).
233. See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text.
234. Even though examiners are experts in determining patent eligibility, the addition of a
small adversarial element could help to ensure that time-strapped examiners consider all
arguments bearing on patentability. Data recently released by the Office shows that the Office
frequently reverses or adjusts examiner decisions postissuance when “ex parte reexaminations”
are requested. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING
DATA - JUNE 30, 2012 1–2, available at http://assets.sbnation.com/assets/1619547/
Ex_parte_reexam_stats.pdf (providing data suggesting that only 22 percent of those patents that
undergo reexamination emerge with all claims confirmed, and that 92 percent of all requests for
reexamination are granted).
235. See, e.g., Kesan, supra note 44, at 776–83 (noting that the issuance of patents with
questionable validity “may be ameliorated by adopting an opposition proceeding into the patent
examination process”); Christopher J. Worrel, Improving the Patent System: Community
Sourcing and Pre-Grant Opposition, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 833, 858 (2011) (“There is great support
for utilizing third-party involvement to improve the patent examination process and the patent
system's overall quality.”).
236. See Kesan, supra note 44, at 783 (“Opponents of pre-grant oppositions are correct in
asserting that pre-grant oppositions provide additional opportunities for delay and
harassment.”).
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the now-codified preissuance submissions procedure would lead to
237
the same disastrous results. In balancing those concerns about
§ 122(e) preissuance submissions while nevertheless enacting the
AIA, however, Congress resolved the issue in favor of greater public
participation. Now, for multiple reasons, another incremental
amendment permitting submitter arguments against patentability
would not necessarily induce unfair hardship to applicants.
First, the presumption of validity for issued patents in light of
their prosecution histories, though downplayed somewhat by the
238
Federal Circuit, would continue to moderate submission rates.
Although competition-driven submitters would be better equipped to
present their theories of invalidity, and thus would likely be more
inclined to make submissions, they would still calculate the risk that
the examiner might find their arguments unpersuasive.
Second, any opportunities for competitors to harass applicants
under such an amendment largely exist already under Rule 290. The
proposed amendment would not necessarily require examiners to
respond to submissions or even consider them to any greater extent
239
than required under the current rules. Instead, the sole likely effect
would be greater competitor confidence that their prior-art
submissions would be applied to their full potential. Therefore, an
amendment at this stage would have the greatest impact on those
competitors with genuine bases for challenging the application, rather
than on those who only wish to delay prosecution.
Third, according to the Office’s justification for Rule 290, “Office
rules already prohibit third parties from purposefully ‘flooding’ an
240
application . . . to cause unnecessary delay.” Submitters are subject
241
to 37 C.F.R. § 11.18(b)(2)(i), which requires parties to certify that

237. See McEwen, supra note 152, at 72 n.126 (“[I]ndependent inventors have raised
concerns that [the proposed § 122(e) amendment in the 2005 Act] would allow large
corporations to ‘endlessly contest’ patent applications.”).
238. See supra notes 217–21 and accompanying text.
239. Under Rule 290, examiners are merely required to acknowledge in the application
record that they considered the submitted documents and their accompanying statements of
relevance. See Changes To Implement the Preissuance Submissions by Third Parties Provision
of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,150, 42,153 (July 17, 2012) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.290) (“[E]xaminer consideration of a document and its accompanying
concise description of relevance in a third-party submission does not mean that the examiner
agrees with the third party’s position regarding the document, only that the examiner
considered the publication and its accompanying description.”).
240. Id. at 42,162.
241. 37 C.F.R. § 11.18(b)(2)(i) (2012).
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their submissions are “not being presented for any improper purpose,
such as to harass someone or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
242
increase in the cost of any proceeding.”
Finally, if Congress were to amend § 122(c) to prohibit only
formal opposition procedures or any procedure likely to result in
significant harassment or delay, for example, then the Office could
impose specific measures to limit the likelihood that argument243
containing submissions would be used for abusive ends. For
instance, to prevent harassment, the Office could limit the numbers of
244
protests for each real party in interest. Further, it could designate a
more limited time window for submissions to be filed post
publication. When an examiner rejects a claim, applicants are already
granted the ability to subsequently amend their applications to work
245
around the rejection and submit them to be reexamined. To prevent
delay and the prospect of endless contest, the Office could extend the
submission time window only to the date of the first examiner
rejection. This arrangement would balance the interests of patentees
with those of competitors by ensuring that applicants have the
opportunity to make narrowing amendments. In sum, it would be
both feasible and preferable for Congress to relinquish its ax and
allow the Office to wield a scalpel to specifically address harassment
concerns.
CONCLUSION
An amendment to § 122(c) allowing the public to supplement
their preissuance submissions with direct arguments against
patentability would incentivize those submissions more effectively
than the current scheme. As a result, the amendment would better
carry out the long-held policy objective of the United States Patent
and Trademark Office, harnessing the collective power of the public
to afford greater resources to examiners in making important
patentability determinations. Such a change in policy could have the

242. Id.
243. See Kesan, supra note 44, at 783 (“[Harassment] concerns can be addressed by
procedural devices used to address similar concerns in any litigation or adjudication.”).
244. Id.
245. See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2006) (“[I]f after receiving [a notice of rejection], the applicant
persists in his claim for a patent, with or without amendment, the application shall be
reexamined.”).
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impact of reducing the number of invalid patents without
substantially increasing the risk of harassment and delay.
From the significant breadth of Rule 290, it appears that the
Office believes that increased public participation in patent
examination is sound policy. However, Rule 290 and its underlying
organic provision, § 122(e), are in irreconcilable tension with
§ 122(c)’s proscriptions. Although § 122(c) broadly prohibits all pregrant protests and any other forms of opposition, Rule 290
submissions and protests are strikingly similar, and, in any case, Rule
290 effectively serves as a vehicle for third parties to oppose pending
applications.
Congress, therefore, should end the metaphorical game of Taboo
and amend § 122(c) in a manner that both relieves the legal tension
and allows third parties to fully explain their submissions. Congress
should delegate responsibility to the Office to promulgate targeted
rules to ensure that preissuance submissions with accompanying
arguments are not abused.

